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NEW REGIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA?
Between South African hegemony and globalisation*
This article describes and explains the process of  regionalism in Southern Africa. 
In doing so, it argues that although the new regionalism has come to mark the 
on-going regional integration process, traces of  the old regionalism are still to 
be found at work in the region. The new regionalism expresses itself  through 
the increasing role of  multinational corporations and their investments in cross-
border infrastructure development projects located in development corridors, a 
role previously played exclusively by the state. The new regionalism is expected 
to deepen the levels of  integration in the region and lead to the birth of  a 
common regional agenda that is likely to enable the region to effectively respond 
to the challenges posed by globalisation.
However, the pursuit of  the interests of  the South African state and its mul-
tinationals have often been found to be at variance with those of  its neighbour-
ing states, and this has created widespread resentment of  what is perceived as 
South Africa’s intention to dominate the region. 
Le nouveau régionalisme en Afrique australe ?
Entre hégémonie sud-africaine et globalisation
L’article se propose de décrire et de clarifi er le processus de régionalisation en 
Afrique australe. Il montre que le nouveau régionalisme, qui imprime dorénavant 
sa marque sur l’actuel processus d’intégration régionale, n’est pas sans garder des 
traces de celui de l’époque antérieure. Le nouveau régionalisme est caractérisé par 
le rôle croissant des entreprises multinationales et des investissements qu’elles 
affectent, en particulier, à des projets transfrontaliers de construction d’infra-
structures, situés dans des « corridors de développement », un rôle autrefois tenu 
par la puissance étatique. Ce nouveau régionalisme est censé consolider 
les différents niveaux d’intégration économique de la région et favoriser ainsi 
l’émergence d’un engagement commun entre les pays qui devrait leur permettre 
de faire face aux défi s posés par la globalisation.
Pourtant, la poursuite par l’Afrique du Sud de ses propres intérêts et de ceux de 
ses multinationales s’est souvent trouvée en contradiction avec l’intérêt des États 
voisins, ce qui a provoqué un assez large ressentiment à l’égard de ce que l’on 
considère comme une intention hégémonique de l’Afrique du Sud dans la région.
O novo regionalismo na África austral ?
Entre hegemonia sul-africana e globalização
O artigo pretende descrever e clarifi car o processo de regionalização na África 
austral. Deste modo, ele mostra que o novo regionalismo, que imprime, de hoje 
em diante, a sua marca no actual processo de integração regional, conserva 
traços do da época anterior. O novo regionalismo caracteriza-se pelo papel 
crescente das empresas multinacionais e dos investimentos que elas destinam, em 
particular, ao projectos transfronteiriços de construção de infra-estruturas, situadas 
* The Author writes in his personal capacity and views expressed here are not necessarily 
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em « corredores de desenvolvimento », um papel antigamente desempenhado pelo 
poder estatal. Este novo regionalismo tem como objetivo consolidar os diferentes 
níveis de integração económica da região e favorecer, assim, a emergência de 
um compromisso comum que deverá permitir à região enfrentar os desafi os 
colocados pela globalização.
No entanto, o prosseguimento pela África do Sul dos seus próprios interesses e 
os das suas multinacionais tem estado muitas vezes em contradição com o interesse 
dos Estados vizinhos, provocando um ressentimento muito grande em relação ao 
que se considera uma intenção hegemónica da África do Sul na região.
The resurgence of  regional economic integration in Africa is not entirely new and dates back to the 1958 All Africa’s conference in Ghana, where integra-
tion was mooted as the only economic strategy to reverse Africa’s mendicant 
relations with the West. As the global economies became interconnected through 
the process of  globalisation, new, non-state actors became the dominant players 
in the process and gave birth to the concept known as ‘new’ regionalism. ‘Old’ 
regionalism, also known as ‘fi rst wave’ regionalism, fi rst emerged in the 1950s and 
stagnated in the 1970s1. The old regionalism was introverted, and state driven. 
Thus, argues Hettne, being a state-driven process, it was imposed ‘from above’ 
and focused on economic and security imperatives and was dominated by states 
as main actors. The old regionalism failed due to the slowdown in Western 
European integration and Free Trade Areas in the Third World2. Given its extro-
verted and inclusive nature, the new regionalism, in contrast, is driven not only 
by the state, but involves a large number of  institutions, organisations and move-
ments3. Key actors in this new era include informal cross border traders and 
multinational corporations, which are increasingly viewed as key drivers for Africa’s 
economic development and closer regional cooperation and integration. Indeed, 
notes Shaw, literature on the new regionalism is rooted in the non-state or semi-
state cases from the global South, such as export processing zones, growth tri-
angles in Asia, development corridors in Southern Africa and Diasporas from the 
South in the North4. It is worth noting that while elsewhere in the world regional 
integration stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s, this did not happened in Africa. 
The reason for this, argues Lee, was that the origins of  regionalism in Africa were 
more political than economic, and were motivated by the desire by African lead-
ers to liberate the continent from colonial and neo-colonial domination5.
In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, 
(SADCC)6, the precursor to the Southern African Development Community 
1 B. Hettne & F. Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of  Regionness”, New Political Economy, V (3), 
2000: 457-473.
2 M.C. Lee, The Political Economy of  Regionalism in Southern Africa, Cape Town, UCT Press, 
2003: 29.
3 B. Hettne, “Prologue to the fi ve volumes”, in B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. Sunkel (eds), 
Globalism and the New Regionalism, I, London, Macmillan, 1999: xvii.
4 T. Shaw, “New Regionalism in Africa in the New Millennium: Comparative Perspectives 
on Renaissance, Realism and/or Regression”, New Political Economy (Manchester), V (3) 2000: 403.
5 M.C. Lee, op cit.: 29.
6 The SADCC’s founding members were the heads of  the independent states of  Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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(SADC), with its emphasis on political and security cooperation over economic 
integration represents the ‘old regionalism’ since the state was a key player in the 
regional cooperation agenda. Some of  the striking features of  the old regionalism 
include import substitution on a regional scale, protectionism, collective self-
reliance and the reduction of  dependency and exclusiveness7. In this context, the 
SADCC, which sought to stop economic dependence on South Africa, exemplifi es 
the old regionalism. And while non state actors such as civil society were active 
in the region during the 1980s, they were collaborators in advancing the interests 
of  their national governments. With respect to human interaction, argues 
Soderbaum, neighbouring states supported the South African liberation movement 
amid frenetic efforts by the apartheid regime to reverse this reality. Thus, the old 
regionalism in Southern Africa cannot be separated from the highly ideological 
climate dominated by the cold war and opposition to apartheid 8.
The transformation of  the SADCC into SADC in 1992, and the latter’s empha-
sis on economic integration has seen the rise of  the new regionalism in the region, 
which refl ects a response to, and is consistent with the globalised nature of  the 
world economy. The new regionalism is marked by more openness and interde-
pendence both within the region and between the region and the outside world. 
This is exemplifi ed by the leading role given to the private sector, mainly South 
African companies and civil society organisations in regional programmes such as 
infrastructure development, poverty alleviation and the fi ght against HIV and 
AIDS. Migration and increasing levels of  informal cross border trade are some 
of  the defi ning features and indicators of  the predominance of  the new regional-
ism in Southern Africa. The SADC Treaty commits the organisation to involving 
the peoples of  the region and key stakeholders such as civil society, the private 
sector and other non-governmental organisations in determining the content and 
direction of  regional cooperation and integration. In response to this, civil society 
organisations have created partnerships with SADC and continue to play a sig-
nifi cant role in engaging regional leaders on key issues affecting the region such 
as HIV/AIDS and poverty alleviation. Governments have also signed agreements 
with the private sector, which continues to invest in sectors that were previously 
the preserve of  the state, namely, road infrastructure, communications and energy9. 
Investments have been made in cross border initiatives such as the Lobito and 
Maputo Development Corridors, which confi rms that the new regionalism has 
gained a foothold in the region. Other actors range from multilateral agencies 
such as the World Bank, and development agencies such as the PNUD and the 
UNAIDS10 have invested in regional integration and development in the region. 
Despite these developments, and although non-state actors have come to play 
an increasingly signifi cant role, SADC remains a statist organisation, in which the 
states still play an active role in determining the nature and scope of  regional 
integration. This is partly due to the fact that regional leaders are reluctant to 
 7 See for example SADC Founding Treaty (1980), F. Soderbaum, “The New regionalism in 
Southern Africa”, [undated] online, <www.unisa.ac.za/default.asp?Cmd=ViewContentID=11587:2>.
 8 F. Soderbaum, ibid. 
 9 F. Soderbaum, ibid.: 45.
10 United Nations Development Programme (PNUD) and Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).
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surrender some element of  sovereignty to a common institution such as the SADC 
in shaping the direction of  regionalism. Although market integration is the pre-
dominant strategy being implemented by the SADC, the organisation became 
conscious of  the fact that market forces alone cannot effectively promote regional 
development. It thus adopted, in 1992, the strategy of  ‘developmental integration’ 
which involves the state in spending on education and public health, two issues 
which could redress some of  the main causes for the region’s inability to reap the 
rewards of  globalisation11. This, and the efforts of  regional states to create alli-
ances and pool resources with neighbours in order to effectively respond to the 
challenges posed by globalisation, inevitably locates the state at the centre of  the 
regional integration agenda. The continuous involvement of  the state in social 
development issues suggests that there is a blending of  and co-existence of  the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ forms of  regionalism, which renders the distinctions between 
the two somewhat superfi cial in Southern Africa. The closure of  Hyundai and 
Volvo plants in Botswana, owing to pressure from South Africa, illustrates this 
point, as does the violent xenophobic attacks on migrants who are perceived to 
be threatening the interest of  locals. 
The theme that runs through this discussion is that although it has at times 
been threatened by a number of  challenges, the new regionalism, marked by the 
removal of  obstacles to the free movements of  goods labour and capital has 
deepened integration in the region and has placed Southern Africa in a better 
position to respond to the challenges posed by globalisation. 
Regionalism and Globalisation in Southern Africa
Africa’s historical integration into the world economy and the accelerated glo-
balisation of  the world has had a negative impact on African states. This has 
resulted in the marginalization of  the continent, as smaller and weaker states, 
producers of  primary commodities which are subject to price fl uctuations in the 
world markets, have been left without the infl uence to effectively engage with the 
globalisation process. And, as capital fl ows across national borders, more multina-
tional companies have become more powerful, threatening the survival of  the 
nation state in the developing world. In order to reverse this increasing margin-
alization, African states created regional trading blocks such as SADC, which are 
seen as vehicles through which to effectively advance Africa’s interests in interna-
tional politics. As a result of  the globalisation process, argues Ajulu, developing 
states, already on the defensive, have had to reinvent themselves and forge new 
alliances in order to fi ght for survival in the hostile environment dominated by 
multinational corporations and international fi nancial institutions. This reconstituted 
state, or the ‘activist state’, which had to forge new alliances with transnational 
corporations and multilateral institutions of  global and economic governance, is 
important in our understanding of  the concept of  new regionalism12.
11 M.C. Lee, op cit.: 23.
12 R. Ajulu, “Open versus developmental integration – what options for SADC?”, in Revisiting 
Regionalism, Proceedings of  the Fourth Southern African Forum on Trade (SAFT), held in Pretoria, South 
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In this context, the resurgence of  new regionalism should be seen as a defen-
sive state strategy, part of  a wider strategy to respond to the challenge of  glo-
balisation. Southern African states, like their counterparts in other parts of  Africa, 
lack the resources to deal with the challenge of  globalisation on their own. As a 
result, they have had to pool their resources together in a regional economic 
community like SADC to enable them to collectively deal with the challenges of  
the global markets, and strengthen their bargaining power in world affairs13.
The SADC’s blueprint for integration and economic development, the Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), sees globalisation as providing 
major new opportunities for Southern Africa’s economic revival. In terms of  this 
vision, the economic revolution marking the new millennium could provide the 
context and means for Africa’s rejuvenation. According to this vision, Africa has 
‘no alternative’ but to integrate with the world’ economy14. During the 2003 G8 
summit in Evian, France, Michael Camdessus, the former IMF managing director, 
seemed to speak for many when he said:
“The African heads of  state came to us with the conception that globalisation was 
not a curse for them . . . but rather the opposite [. . .] you can’t believe how much of  
a difference this makes15.”
According to the RISDP, the promotion of  trade in a globalised world is seen as 
a catalyst for deeper regional cooperation and integration. Increased levels of  
intra-regional and world trade should also stimulate economic development and 
drastically reduce poverty in the region. The SADC’s vision dovetails with the 
World Bank’s one, which also argues that regional integration can contribute to 
poverty reduction by strengthening links between the poorest landlocked countries 
and their more prosperous neighbours and by helping establish the basis for faster 
economic growth. Indeed, the World Bank estimates that between forty and sixty per 
cent of  world trade occurs within regional trading blocks16. The Bank’s strategy 
is guided by principles of  ‘open regionalism’, and sees participation of  private 
sector and civil society as crucial for development. 
In keeping with this trend, the new regionalism in Southern Africa has been 
expressed through higher levels of  interaction and partnerships between the pub-
lic and private sector, and the latter’s increasing prominence in determining the 
direction of  regional integration in the region. 
South African Multinationals and Regionalism in Southern Africa
The most pronounced economic realities in Southern Africa are South Africa’s 
economic hegemony and the unequal level of  development among SADC member 
Africa, 3-4 September 2007, Midrand, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Windhoek, Frederick 
Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2008: 26-28.
13 Ibid.: 28.
14 SADC, RISDP.
15  Quoted in C. Mulaudzi, “The Politics of  Regionalism in southern Africa”, Occasional paper 
51, Midrand, Institute for Global Dialogue, April 2006: 10.
16 See SADC, RISDP, online <www.sadc.int>.
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states. South Africa is sub-Saharan Africa’s most industrialised country and generates 
seventy-one per cent of  the SADC’s GNP17. Given these realities, the country has 
been overburdened with expectations that it would use its wealth and multinational 
corporations to lead the revival of  Africa’s moribund economies and reverse the 
continent’s marginalization in international affairs. In response to these expecta-
tions, the ANC-led South African government has been at the forefront of  efforts 
aimed at promoting economic development in the region and elsewhere in Africa. 
Eager to exploit Africa’s markets, South African multinational companies, with 
the support of  the South African government, have played an increasingly sig-
nifi cant role in promoting foreign direct investment in the region and elsewhere 
in Africa. These forays into African markets dovetail with, and are inspired by 
the Mbeki’s African Renaissance project which locates South African capital at 
the centre of  as well as a catalyst for regional integration and economic growth18. 
And this has turned South African multinationals into formidable players in the 
advancement of  the unfolding discourse of  new regionalism in southern Africa. 
For an appreciation of  the role played by South African capital in promoting 
the new regionalism, it would be useful to provide a brief  background and con-
text for the country’s role in regional economic integration. In 1993, a few months 
before the ANC came to power, Nelson Mandela argued that a democratic South 
Africa would forge closer economic relations with other Southern African states 
in order to reverse South Africa’s economic domination of  the region19. Since 
1994, South African investors in SADC region have covered a broad and diverse 
spectrum of  business activity; parastatals and private sector companies, and include 
small, medium and large enterprises. Notable investments have been made in 
energy projects such as the US$1.1 billion in Pande and Temane gas fi elds in 
Mozambique by South Africa’s fuel corporation (SASOL); $860 million in the 
expansion of  the Mozal aluminium smelter project by BHP Billiton, the Independent 
Development Corporation (IDC) and Mitsubishi, millions were spent by mobile 
communications company Vodacom in Tanzania, etc. 
In the energy sector, integration has also been expressed through the Southern 
African Power Pool, which seeks to integrate the power grids of  Southern African 
states and distribute electricity to rural and underserved communities. A major 
component of  the Power Pool is the rehabilitation of  Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa 
hydroelectric dam on the Zambezi River, linking power lines between Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. The project involves the governments of  Mozambique 
and South Africa and the electricity utility companies of  the two countries, namely, 
South Africa’s ESKOM and Mozambique’s electricity producer, Hidroelectrica de 
Cahora Bassa20. 
17 M.C. Lee, op cit.: 62.
18 D. Games, “The Experience of  South African Firms doing Business in Africa: A Preliminary 
Survey and Analysis”, Business in Africa Report, 1, South African Institute for International Affairs 
(SAIIA), Johannesburg, 2004, online <www.saiia.org.za>.
19 N. Mandela, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, LXXII (5) 1993: 86.
20 A. Conchiglia, “South Africa and its lusophone neighbours: Angola and Mozambique”, in 
South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji & C. Landsberg (eds), Scottsville, 
University of  Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2007: 249.
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However, the trade balance remains skewed in favour of  South Africa21 and 
these disparities have made the initial optimism that South African investments 
would level the playing fi eld in the region begin to wane, and in the process 
creating resentment for South Africa in some parts of  the continent. 
Mandela’s call received a further boost when, during the months leading up to 
the 1994 elections in South Africa, the ANC issued a policy statement that would 
later serve as a guide to South Africa’s post apartheid foreign policy in Africa. 
The statement is worth quoting as it enables us to understand the reason behind 
South Africa’s investments in Southern Africa:
“The region sustained us during our struggle and, with our own; its people’s blood 
was spilled to end apartheid. Our destiny is intertwined with the region’s; our peoples 
belong to each other [. . .] We are convinced that the long-term interests of  the South 
African economy will best be served by an approach to regional cooperation and 
integration which seeks to promote balanced growth and development.”22
The ANC statement is signifi cant in one interesting way, among others. Southern 
African states, particularly Angola and Mozambique, suffered heavily from apart-
heid South Africa’s destabilisation campaigns when that country sought to eviscer-
ate the liberation movements such as the ANC and SWAPO. The campaign 
included heavy bombardment, military invasion (in the case of  Angola), and 
military support for rebel movements such as Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 
(Renamo) in Mozambique and União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA) in Angola. This had a devastating impact on the regional economies, 
and the region continues to deal with the legacy of  these confl icts. Thus, given 
these realities, it is perhaps not surprising, as suggested by Tevera and Chimowu, 
that South African investments in regional cross border initiatives such as the 
Maputo development Corridor provide the country with an ‘indirect sense of  
moral restitution’23.
Since the assumption of  political power by the ANC in 1994, South Africa’s 
African policy has coalesced around the notion of  the ‘African Renaissance’. It 
suggested fi ve areas of  engagement with the African continent: the encouragement 
of  cultural exchange; the emancipation of  the African woman from patriarchy; 
the mobilisation of  the youth; the broadening, deepening and sustaining democracy; 
and the initiation of  sustainable economic development. Since then Mbeki has 
sought to place South Africa at the forefront of  solving Africa’s problems through 
his advocacy of  the renaissance concept. Indeed, one of  the key elements of  the 
renaissance concept is to deepen regional cooperation and integration aimed at 
reducing the disadvantages created by small markets24. 
Observers such as Vale and Maseko have noted that Mbeki’s vision of  the 
Renaissance refl ects a ‘globalist’ response to the continent’s problems: 
21 D. Games, ibid.: 12-13.
22 C.B. Thompson, “Regional Challenges to Globalisation: Perspectives from Southern Africa”, 
New Political Economy, V (1) 2000: 44.
23 D. Tevera & A. Chimohwu, “Situating the Maputo Development Corridor: Progress achieved 
and Lessons learned”, in F. Soderbaum & I. Taylor (eds), Regionalisation and Uneven Development in 
Southern Africa: The case of  the Maputo Development Corridor, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003: 36.
24 Ibid.: 267.
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“The African Renaissance suggests a continental effort led by South Africa to advance 
the familiar ‘end of  history’ thesis [. . .] South Africa’s African Renaissance is anchored 
in a chain of  economics, which, with time, might become the African equivalent of  
the Asian Tigers [. . .] the East Asian economic miracle [. . .] has offered hope to the 
people of  Africa [. . .] the African Renaissance posits Africa as an expanding and 
prosperous market alongside Asia, Europe and North America in which South African 
capital is destined to play a special role through the development of  trade, strategic 
partnerships and the like in exchange for acting as the agent of  globalisation, the 
continent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised 
largesse of  oil, minerals and mining.”25
That Mbeki’s vision of  an African renaissance should be so regarded is indeed 
not surprising. This is because South Africa is the ‘the closest thing Africa has to 
a superpower’, and this has turned the country into the object of  expectations of  
a more active role in solving the continent’s problems26. As one South African 
businessman noted, South African has an important role to play in investments 
in Africa because ‘every continent needs an America’27. Julius Nyerere, the former 
president of  Tanzania, during his address to the South African parliament in 
1997, called upon South Africans to ‘take their responsibilities’ and stop hiding 
behind false modesty as isolationism is an excuse for selfi shness28. 
In response to these expectations, South Africa, especially under President Mbeki, 
has located itself  as a key player and spokesperson for Africa in continental and 
world politics, particularly in multilateral institutions such as the UN, the WTO 
and the Commonwealth. NEPAD is one of  the most innovative programmes 
initiated by former president Mr. Thabo Mbeki, along with the leaders of  Algeria, 
Nigeria and Senegal. Some of  the key programmes that exemplify the new region-
alism: development corridors and the involvement of  the private sectors in economic 
development have been incorporated into NEPAD.
But although the renaissance was enthusiastically received at home, it failed to 
fi nd supporters elsewhere on the continent. The reasons for its frosty reception 
were among others, the following. Firstly, in a continent whose leaders are prone 
to ‘petty jealousies and obscurantist inclinations’, it was viewed as the creation of  
an idealistic and inexperienced leader who had yet to earn his credentials as a 
true African leader. Secondly, the more cynical saw in it an attempt by South 
Africa to impose its own hegemony on the continent. Thirdly, the renaissance 
concept is considered as an extension of  and revival of  Kwame Nkrumah’s failed 
Pan-African dream. The romanticism of  the African Renaissance, argue Alden 
and Le Pere, full of  metaphors of  ‘revival and rebirth, and awakening,’ has had 
to contend with other pressing realities that lie behind Africa’s marginalization: 
war, confl ict, HIV/AIDS, poverty, malnutrition, drought, and underdevelopment29. 
25 P. Vale & S. Maseko, “South Africa and the African Renaissance”, International Affairs, 
LXXIV (2), 1998: 279.
26 I. Taylor & P. Williams, “South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African 
Renaissance meets Vagabondage Politique?”, African Affairs, 2001, 100 : 266.
27 N. Grobbelaar, “Every Continent Needs an America: The experience of  South African 
Firms doing business in Mozambique”, Business in Africa Report, 2, 2004: 5.
28 P. Vale & S. Maseko, op. cit.: 283.
29 C. Alden & G. Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, in W. Carlnaes & 
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Indeed, the energy invested by the South African government in NEPAD irri-
tated other African leaders who resent(ed) the international attention paid to 
NEPAD in comparison to the African Union (AU). NEPAD’s fl agship project, the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, is widely seen as borrowing heavily from con-
ventional neoliberal economic and political orthodoxies that are unpopular in parts 
of  Africa, and has yet to fi nd universal acclaim and resonance across the continent. 
Indeed, NEPAD and AU have been criticised for duplication of  projects and slow 
implementation, prompting the Senegalese president to withdraw from the NEPAD 
Steering Committee in March 2007. There are also accusations that Mbeki’s 
devotion to NEPAD has allowed it to become a rival to the AU30. With Thabo 
Mbeki, the former South African president out of  the political limelight, it remains 
to be seen how his successor and other African leaders will be willing to commit 
to the full implementation of  NEPAD into the future. 
Although the expansion of  South African business into the African continent 
has inspired doubts about the country’s real intentions, and has not always resulted 
in impressive rates of  economic development, Africa appears to have no alterna-
tive but to embrace South African capital as most Western multinationals have 
shown a wariness to invest in a continent often plagued by political instability. 
And as will be shown in the discussion on Mozambique, one of  the striking 
outcomes of  South African investments in the region has been to raise the con-
fi dence of  that country as an ideal investment destination for Western multinational 
corporations. 
There is considerable debate on the ‘hegemonic’ intentions of  the South African 
government in Southern Africa. However, owing to constraints of  space, this will 
not be discussed here31.
Explaining South African Investments in Africa
Apart from the moral restitution narrative, a number of  reasons have been given 
to explain South African investment in Africa32. However, space constraints dictate 
P. Nel (eds), In Full Flight, South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid, Institute for Global Dialogue 
Publishers, Midrand, 2006: 58.
30 C. Landsberg, “South Africa and the making of  the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki’s 
‘progressive African agenda’”, in A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji & C. Landsberg (eds), South Africa in 
Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, Scottsville, UKZN Press, 2007, 196-206.
31 D.J. Myers, Regional Hegemons: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Response, Boulder, Westview, 1991. 
This author describes regional hegemons as ‘states which possess suffi cient power to dominate 
subordinate state systems’. Hegemons aspire to lead, and are often endowed with military, eco-
nomic, and other resources, and have a political and socioeconomic vision whose implementation 
they are prepared to underwrite.
32 Other observers as D.T. McKinley (“Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign 
Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki”, online <www.sarpn.org.za/documentsd000263.index.php>, 
March 2003. p. 4-9) and P. Bond (“The George Bush of  Africa: Pretoria Chooses Sub imperial-
ism”, online, <www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/04/07bushafrica.pdf>, 01 July 2004, p. 4-6.), argue that 
the intentions of  the South African government are not a selfl ess act aimed at uplifting the 
regional economy. McKinley, for example argues that by extending the mandate of  state owned 
enterprises such as the IDC and the Development Bank of  Southern Africa (DBSA), to fund 
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us to focus on the most compelling one. South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa is 
undoubtedly informed by its domestic realities. Despite being the regional economic 
powerhouse, the South African economy has lost more than one million jobs since 
1994, while over 53 percent of  its citizens live in poverty33. South African policy-
makers agree that South Africa cannot be an island of  prosperity surrounded by 
a sea of  poverty. According to this thesis, it is in South Africa’s interest to promote 
private sector investment and peace in Southern Africa since an economically 
prosperous Africa would result in the reduction of  illegal immigration to South 
Africa34. South Africa, it is argued, ‘cannot prosper in isolation from its sister 
countries, particularly in the neighbourhood’35. 
The creation of  the SADC Free Trade Area in August 200836, if  implemented 
successfully, will be of  great benefi t to the region, especially in view of  the failure 
of  market integration elsewhere in Africa. And although South Africa as the economic 
giant is likely to benefi t the most from deeper integration, there continues to be a 
great potential for a mutually benefi cial form of  regionalism in the region.
However, for some Africans, the march southward in search of  a better life in 
South Africa, which is seen as a ‘veritable paradise [. . .] the place to be’37 has 
not brought the much expected prosperity. Instead, notes Vale, most African 
migrants in South Africa have been subjected to a regime of  ‘violent othering’. 
The level of  brutality visited upon black African immigrants has often been 
reminiscent of  the worst excesses of  the country’s apartheid past38. The following 
story is instructive. 
projects throughout the region, the South African government intends to maintain hegemonic 
control on the regional economy. It is also noteworthy, as A. Goldstein (“Regional Integration, 
FDI and Competitiveness: The Case of  SADC”, OECD African Investment Roundtable, 19 November 
2003, p. 21-23) reminds us, that the investment behaviour of  South African companies is typical 
of  developing countries multinationals. Their investment drive into neighbouring states has been 
motivated by the belief  that they will face less competition from local fi rms in their new coun-
tries of  investment, and that they can use their superior business practices to position themselves 
advantageously even in relation to international subsidiaries. To many South African businessmen, 
Africa is a huge market, which though turbulent at times, provides good returns on investment.
33 M.C. Lee, op. cit.: 62.
34 C. Landsberg, “South Africa: A Pivotal State in Africa”, Synopsis, VII (1), April 2004: 1-2, 
online <www.cps.org.za>. This observation resonates with and partly explains South Africa’s 
continued support for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) made up of  Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. SACU members such as Lesotho and Swaziland 
are almost completely dependent on South Africa and derive more than fi fty percent of  their 
revenues from the SACU development fund.
35 Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa), Strategic Plan 2008-2011: 3-10.
36 Eleven of  the fourteen member states of  the SADC have offi cially launched a free trade area 
(FTA), August 2008, with the aim of  eliminating tariffs and trade barriers among their countries 
and to create a regional market. Angola, the RDC and Malawi will join the FTA later.
37 Quoted in M. Prys, Developing a Contextualily Relevant Concept of  Regional Hegemony: The Case 
of  South Africa, Zimbabwe and “Quiet Diplomacy”, GIGA Working Papers <www.giga-hamburg.
de/workingpapers>, 77, May 2008: 17.
38 P. Vale, “Migration, Xenophobia and Security-making in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, 
Politikon, XXIX (1) 2002: 7-8.
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“In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a 
train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out of  the train while the other two, both 
Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof  trying to escape 
the crowd. This violence was visited by members of  a crowd who had gathered in 
Pretoria to protest under the banner of  an organisation called ‘Unemployed Masses 
of  South Africa’ . . .”39
In October 1998, 18 people suffocated in an unventilated container in which they 
were travelling to South Africa. Each had paid R200 to the smugglers. In the 
same month, another Mozambican immigrant was killed and eaten by wild animals 
while crossing the border between South Africa and Mozambique40. As the rate 
of  unemployment rises in South Africa, more migrants have been victimised for 
‘taking’ jobs from locals, resulting in high levels of  xenophobia. In the recent 
outbreak of  such attacks in May 2008, over 53 Africans, including South Africans 
died in parts of  South Africa41. Here, the free movement of  people, which is one 
of  the hallmarks of  the new regionalism, appears to be under threat from the 
efforts of  individuals who feel that the inclusive nature of  the new regionalism 
through human integration poses a threat to their survival. 
The Old and the New regionalism Collide in Botswana
In stark contrast to old regionalism, the new regionalism fully embraces globalisa-
tion as it encourages factors of  production to move to places where an enabling 
environment for investment exists. However, the behaviour of  the South African 
government has at times served as a stark reminder that the differences between 
the two forms of  regionalism are superfi cial. The following example is instructive 
as an illustration of  what can be interpreted as a tendency to perpetuate the 
region’s economic dependence on South Africa. 
In what Good and Hughes call a ‘classical globalisation’ scenario, namely an 
enabling environment, strong currency, lack of  foreign exchange restrictions, tax 
holidays and the country’s political and social stability, Hyundai and Volvo estab-
lished car assembly plants in Gaborone, Botswana in the early 1990s. The two 
companies were also motivated by their proximity to the South African market 
across the border. However in 1999, after operating for six years in that country, 
the two car manufacturers were forced to close their assembly plants and relocate 
to Pretoria amid pressure from the South African government and the trade union 
movements who feared that the entire South African motor industry could also 
relocate to Botswana where labour was relatively cheap, skilled and unorganised. 
39 Quoted in P. Vale, ibid. For a detailed discussion on the predicament of  illegal immigrants 
in South Africa see Human Rights Watch, “Prohibited Persons: Abuse of  Undocumented Migrants, 
Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in South Africa”, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1998.
40 P. Vale, ibid.: 8-9.
41 “Third force blamed for xenophobic attacks”, <www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_
id=13&art_id=vn2008051405590017>. South Africa derailed the signing of  the SADC protocol on 
the free movement of  people in the region. The South African government argued that it would 
be premature to open borders before there is greater economic parity in the region (S.J. MacLean, 
“Peace-Building and the New Regionalism in Southern Africa”, in N. Poku (ed). Security and 
Development in Southern Africa, Praeger, London, 2001: 128.
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South Africa facilitated the relocation of  the two motor assembly plants through 
a combination of  tariff  barriers that made it almost impossible for the smaller 
operations to export their cars to South Africa. South Africa’s resentment to 
‘peripheral development’ in Gaborone resulted in the loss of  450 jobs. The closure 
happened beside claims by the then South Africa’s Trade and Industry minister, 
Alec Erwin’s assertion that ‘it is in our interest that our neighbours begin to 
industrialise and grow’42. South Africa is obviously caught between the pursuit of  
its national interest and the attempt to promote regional development and indus-
trialisation. Stoneman’s observation that ‘it is unrealistic to expect nations [. . .] to 
behave altruistically’43 certainly fi nds some resonance here. An astonishing feature 
of  South Africa’s action was that while successful undermining industrialisation 
ventures in Botswana, it has continued to invest in heavy infrastructure and iron 
smelting plants in Maputo. These contradictions, argues Simon, are a refl ection 
of  the long historical and contemporary importance of  Mozambique as an export 
route for South African industry, which requires good industrial infrastructure. 
Maputo also offers cheaper use of  gas resources, land and labour. Mozambique 
is also a large source of  legal and illegal immigration to South Africa, a phenom-
enon the South Africans hope to curb through their investments and employment 
creation in Mozambique. Botswana on the other hand is a minor source of  
migration and its motor industry poses a direct threat to South Africa’s manufac-
turing industry44. 
The example discussed in the preceding paragraph suggests that the rhetoric 
of  ‘new regionalism’ and development through cooperation needs to be treated 
with caution. Perceived national self-interest is still the driving force and determi-
nant of  state behaviour. In this sense, there appears to be very little to distinguish 
between the ‘new’ from the ‘old’ regionalism45. 
Regional Development Corridors
Development Corridors, which are focal points for regional development initiatives 
in Southern Africa, constitute one of  the key indicators of  the new regionalism 
in the region. Originally based on SADCC plans to develop and upgrade infra-
structure projects such as roads, corridors are considered to be signifi cant catalysts 
for the achievement of  SADC’s economic goals, especially the creation of  effi cient 
transport links to the sea. The implementation of  some of  the development cor-
ridors also forms part of  the NEPAD short-tem action Plan as they are considered 
essential to overcoming the fragmentation of  the African markets. The most sig-
42 K. Good & S. Hughes, “Globalization and Diversifi cation: Two Cases in Southern Africa”, 
African Affairs”, 101, 2002: 47-52. Other examples of  South African sabotage include aborted 
attempts by Swaziland to establish a fertiliser factory, a plant for assembling television sets in 
Lesotho, and Namibia’s attempt to set up a Citroen motor vehicle assembly plant.
43 C. Stoneman, “Lessons Unlearned: South Africa’s One-way Relationship with Zimbabwe”, 
in D. Simon (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa, 1998: 99.
44 D. Simon, “Regional Development-Environmental discourses, policies and practices in post-apartheid Southern 
Africa”, in J.A. Grant and F. Soderbaum (eds), New Regionalisms in Africa, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003: 
77-78. 
45 D. Simon, ibid: 78.
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nifi cant aspect of  development corridors, which resonates with the concept of  new 
regionalism, is the introduction of  the concept of  Private Public Partnerships, 
which has seen the increased involvement of  the private sector in developing 
regional infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, a role previously played 
by the state. Over twelve projects have been identifi ed as corridors that create 
road and rail links with other countries in the region. Some of  the most notable 
projects include the North-south Corridor, which links South Africa to countries 
to its north, and is by far the most extensive and busiest regional transit link in 
Southern Africa. Also known as the Durban Corridor, it links eight countries with 
the Durban harbour in South Africa and with other regional corridors: the Trans-
Kalahari, Beira, Lobito in Angola, Tazara and Nacala corridors. The North-South 
corridor is considered one of  the most critical corridors as it links a number of  
countries with the port of  Durban, which is the largest trading partner for 
most countries in the region46. The corridors are at different stages of  develop-
ment, and due to space constraints, only some of  those involving lusophone 
countries, namely, the Maputo and Lobito Development Corridors are discussed 
briefl y in this article. 
The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) is the most prominent spatial development 
initiative in Southern Africa. The corridor, conceptualised by the Mozambican 
and South African governments, involves the rehabilitation of  road and rail links 
between Maputo and South Africa’s economic heartland of  Johannesburg, 
Gauteng47. Designed as a mixed industrial and agro tourism project, the MDC 
will, according to South Africa’s Department of  Trade and Industry (DTI), even-
tually benefi t South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
However, thus far the benefi ts have been primarily confi ned to South Africa and 
Mozambique – and primarily the former. South African interests in the project 
are twofold. First, South Africa wants access to the port of  Maputo, which is 
closer to Johannesburg than Durban. Second, and perhaps more important, Pretoria 
is keen to boost the development of  the economically marginal and impoverished 
Mpumalanga province, which borders on Mozambique. 
The dominant neoclassical paradigm, supported by the World Bank and some 
western governments holds that large developmental projects such as the MDC 
will benefi t local communities. However, the radical political economy thesis chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that large projects necessarily bring with them 
socio-economic and environmental benefi ts for affected communities. In the context 
of  this debate, it is noteworthy that the MDC has not benefi ted poor communi-
ties in its vicinity. By imposing new social and infrastructural costs on what was 
once provided free of  charge, the corridor has actually increased the cost of  liv-
ing of  ordinary people in both countries. The MDC has also not succeeded 
signifi cantly in creating jobs. Thus far, an investment of  R67 billion has generated 
only 63 000 jobs – translating into a cost of  R1 million per job. This is not 
46 “Corridors driving infrastructure development”, SADC Today, IX (1), April 2006, <www/sadrc.
net/editorial/sadctoday/view.asp?vol=352&pubno=v9n1>.
47 C. Mulaudzi, “The Politics of  Regionalism in Southern Africa”, Occasional paper, 51, Midrand, 
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), April 2006: 13.
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sustainable or replicable by other SADC member states. Thus this highly intensive 
development strategy may not be suitable for regional economies whose factor 
endowments are cheap labour and raw materials. Whether the MDC will con-
tribute to SADC’s objectives of  regional economic co-operation and integration 
on the basis of  “balance, equity and mutual benefi t” remains to be seen. The 
project does seem to resonate with SADC’s aim of  moving towards regional 
cooperation in all economic sectors as well as the free movement of  factors of  
production, trade and investment across natural borders. While the MDC was 
conceptualised and implemented outside the SADC framework, the organisation 
has since adopted the project as a model for future regional transport corridors. 
While this project has brought Mozambique and South African closer together, 
there are fears that projects like these could undermine regional unity as they 
introduce subregions and microregions within broader ones48. It has been argued 
that while development corridors may reduce spatial imbalances in relatively 
developed states such as South Africa, they may have a polarising effect on less 
developed countries such as Mozambique. There have been complaints of  south-
ern domination because more that 70% of  industrial activity in Mozambique is 
already confi ned to the Beira and Maputo regions.
The Lobito Development Corridor, also known as the Benguela Corridor, is centred on 
the rehabilitation of  the Benguela railway line linking the Zambian copper belt, 
the DRC and the port of  Lobito in Angola, which is an important outlet to the 
Atlantic Ocean. Other aspects of  the project involve the removal of  mines along 
the corridor, rebuilding bridges destroyed during the Angolan civil war, as well as 
road links to the DRC, Zambia and Namibia to the south. Situated along areas 
with rich agricultural and mineral resources, the project intends to create jobs 
through the revival of  farming activities and start producing produce, which Angola 
used to export before the outbreak of  the civil war, namely maize, coffee, sisal 
and tropical fruits. The project has since the cessation of  hostilities in 2002, 
received enthusiastic support from the Angolan government which estimates that 
the project could benefi t at least forty per cent of  its population. Over 1304 kilo-
metres of  the corridor are inside Angolan borders, while 755 kilometres pass 
through the DRC mining province of  Katanga and the remaining 90 kilometres 
stretch is on Zambian soil. The implementation of  the project was affected by 
the Angolan civil war in the 1980s and today is threatened by the lack of  com-
mitment by the DRC and Zambia and the ‘inertia’ and ‘the wait and see attitude 
of  potential fi nanciers’49. It is diffi cult to tell how much the entire project will 
cost, but a feasibility study conducted by the SADCC in 1987 estimated that the 
projects would cost US$575 million over a three phased implementation programme 
over a ten-year period50. The delay in the implementation of  the Lobito Corridor 
is instructive and stands in total contrast to the Maputo Development Corridor. 
It also shows that projects of  a bilateral nature, such as the Maputo Corridor, 
48 Ibid.: 14.
49 Lobito Corridor, Project No.3.3.3 (Feasibility Study), Regional Programme of  Action for Economic 
Development and Regional Integration, International Conference on the Great Lakes region, March 2006.
50 Ibid.
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particularly when they serve the national interests of  a wealthy neighbour such 
as South Africa, are relatively easier and quicker to implement than those involv-
ing more than two countries with limited sources of  funding. 
South Africa and Mozambique, models for the new regionalism? 
The economies of  Mozambique and South Africa are the most integrated in the 
region. The two countries have been linked through migration, transport and 
culture, with Mozambican constituting a signifi cant proportion of  mineworkers on 
South Africa’s mines since the late nineteenth century. Since the end of  the 
Mozambican civil war and South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994,  relations 
between the two countries have grown considerably in all fi elds, but mainly in the 
area of  economic cooperation and investment. In 2002, Mozambique had  overtaken 
Zimbabwe as South Africa’s largest trading partner on the African continent. During 
that year, South Africa accounted for twenty-seven percent of  Mozambique’s 
imports. In 2004, thirteen percent of  South Africa’s overall exports to Africa went 
to Mozambique. High levels of  political coordination exist between the two countries, 
and are refl ected in bilateral agreements such as the Joint Per manent Commission 
for Cooperation of  1994 and the Heads of  state Economic bilateral Forum estab-
lished in 1997 with the intention of  overseeing the implementation of  strategic 
projects between the two countries. Under these agreements, Ministers and high level 
offi cials from both countries meet quarterly to discuss strategic bilateral projects51. 
These have also been made possible by the warm personal relations between the 
former presidents of  the two countries, Thabo Mbeki and Joachim Chissano. 
The role of  South African capital and the high levels of  informal cross border 
trade and migration between the two countries represent the most recognisable 
example(s) of  the new regionalism in Southern Africa. It is also striking that the 
most signifi cant outcome of  South African capital has been the industrialisation 
of  the Mozambican economy. Once dominated by agriculture and the service 
sector, the Mozambican economy has been transformed signifi cantly, and industry 
now accounts for over 34,3 percent of  the country’s GDP. Between 1994 and 
2001, South African investments in Mozambique reached a total of  US$ 4,6 billion. 
The two governments have also signed a Memorandum of  Understanding to build 
a US$1,3 billion hydroelectric dam in the Zambezi valley52. The Mozal aluminium 
smelter in Mozambique and the Pande and Temane gas supplying gas from 
Mozambique to Secunda in South Africa through a 865 kilometres pipeline, already 
discussed elsewhere in this paper, are the largest investment ventures in the coun-
try since it gained independence from Portugal in 1975. 
The free movement of  capital between Mozambique and South Africa is 
complemented by ‘human integration’, often expressed through south Africa’s 
enactment after 1994, of  legislation and bilateral agreements aimed at helping 
Mozambican migrants and refugees become permanent residents in South Africa. The 
2003 labour migration agreement between the two countries offered legal protec-
tion to 72 000 legal migrant Mozambican workers – including 60 000 mineworkers 
51 A. Conchiglia, op. cit.: 48.
52 A. Conchiglia, op. cit.: 247-248.
62 christopher mulaudzi
and 12 000 farm workers in South Africa53. The excellent relations between the 
two countries, and the seamless integration of  Mozambican citizens into South 
African society, provide an exceptional case of  integration, which is yet to be seen 
elsewhere in the region. However, the xenophobic attacks on several Mozambicans 
migrants in South Africa, both in the 1990s and during the May 2008 outbreak 
of  such violence, represent a negative aspect of  the integration process. 
One of  the most notable outcomes of  South African investments in Mozambique, 
apart from the reduction in Mozambique trade defi cit, has been to inspire con-
fi dence among other foreign investors in Mozambique as a safe investment desti-
nation. In 2002, the high levels of  FDI (foreign direct investment) fl ows into 
Mozambique were to ensure that the proportion of  private investment in the 
country’s economy was higher than that of  public investment, although foreign aid 
still accounted for forty-eight percent of  the country’s national budget in 200454. 
Viewed from this perspective, the excellent bilateral relations between 
Mozambique and South Africa represent the best and advanced form of  economic 
integration not found anywhere in the region, and if  replicated elsewhere with 
the same kind of  dynamism and effi ciency, could stimulate economic growth in 
the region. However, regional integration remains a politically driven agenda, 
decided by politicians and not by civil society organisations. The disjuncture 
between what is of  interest to and professed by politicians on the one hand, and 
what is of  interest to ordinary people on the other, calls into question the 
potential benefi t for ordinary people, of  elite driven projects such as the Maputo 
Development Corridor. Incidents such as xenophobic attacks in South Africa 
not only constitute an unwelcome distraction to the elite-driven integration 
process but also serve as a reminder that ordinary citizens do not share the vision 
of  their leaders. 
South Africa and Angola, challenges and prospects for a strategic 
partnership
As will be shown now, South Africa is yet to reach such levels of  integration with 
Angola, the other Lusophone regional neighbour to the North West.
Angola, a key member of  SADC since its inception, is sub-Saharan Africa’s 
second-largest oil producer after Nigeria and has experienced impressive rates of  
economic growth since the end of  civil war in 2002. According to the IMF, 
Angola’s economy is expected to grow by 15-20 per cent per year for the next 
decade and beyond, while its GDP was estimated to be at US$ 61.33 billion in 
2007, one of  the largest in the region after South Africa55. Blessed with vast 
natural and mineral resources, the country has the potential to be one of  the 
regional powerhouses in the region, and has at times been prone to seeing itself  
as such. Angola has played a decisive role in promoting its own interests and 
those of  its allies in the Great Lakes region. Two noteworthy examples are, fi rst; 
53 Ibid.: 251.
54 Ibid.: 249.
55 R. Dowden, Africa, Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, London, Portobello Books, 2008: 221-22. 
See also <www.delago.ec.europa.eu/ao/assuntos_especiais/longa_parceria_UEANG.htm> (UE 
Relations with Angola).
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Angola’s successful military forays in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997-98 in support of  
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, an ally of  president Dos Santos, against the elected 
president Pascal Lissouba, whose close ties with and support for UNITA rebels 
posed a threat to stability in Angola. The second example was Angola’s interven-
tion in the DRC in support of  president Kabila’s government. The DRC interven-
tion was motivated by the MPLA government’s determination to disrupt UNITA 
operations and diamond smuggling routes in [through] Southern Congo. Although 
as well as the country’s economic potential, led some among the Angolan elite to 
boast about the ‘superiority’ of  their country56, an implication that unlike other 
poorer nations in the region, Angola does not need South African capital to revive 
its economy. 
Despite these subtle tensions, the Angolan elites agree that South Africa, given 
its resources the country has comparative advantage of  being a key player in 
the country’s reconstruction. After the offi cial visit by then Deputy President 
Jacob Zuma to Luanda in 2004, relations between the two countries improved 
and there has been a steady increase in the number of  Angolan students studying 
in South Africa, especially after the promise that the South African government 
would provide scholarships to Angolan students in South Africa. South African 
construction companies have been involved in construction projects worth over 
US$ 450 million, and South Africa is the third largest exporter to Angola after 
Portugal and the United States57. 
However, despite these developments, and the history of  MPLA government 
support for the ANC during the liberation war, the levels of  integration between 
the two countries, both economically and politically are somewhat low. The reasons 
for this, which are speculative, are the following; fi rst unlike in Mozambique, the 
two former South African leaders, Mandela and Mbeki, did not have strong per-
sonal relations with Eduardo dos Santos, the Angolan leader on the same scale 
that they had with the leaders of  Mozambique58. Second, Angola, unlike 
Mozambique, does not share a common border with South Africa, which has 
prevented the birth of  strong ‘cultural’ ties and the levels of  human integration 
that exist between South Africa and some of  its immediate neighbours. Linked 
to this is the fact that Angola has forged closer ties with Brazil, China and Portugal, 
and has not focused entirely on South Africa for foreign direct investment. For 
example, in 2004, China’s Eximbank approved a $2 billion loan for Angola’s 
reconstruction at an interest rate of  1.5 per cent over seventeen years in return 
for guaranteed supplies of  oil. A further $2.5 billion was being negotiated in 
2006-2007, thus making China the most infl uential foreign player in the Angolan 
economy. South Africa does not offer the kinds of  incentives that the Chinese are 
56 A. Conchiglia, op. cit.: 242. See also, T. Lehtinen, “The Forgotten War in the Congo 
(Brazzaville)”, <www.confl icttransform.net/Republic%20of%20the%20Congo.pdf>, and “Armed 
Confl icts Report-Congo”, <www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Congo.html>.
57 Ibid.: 244.
58 Ibid.: 241. It took Nelson Mandela four years to visit Angola after the ANC came to power 
in 1994. Some in Angola saw this delayed visit as an insult to a country that had sacrifi ced so 
much for the liberation of  South Africa.
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able to provide. Angola has also become China’s biggest supplier of  oil59. With 
a generous and powerful friend in China, Angola, unlike some of  its poorer 
neighbours in Southern Africa is in a stronger position to ignore the role that a 
middle power like South African could play in its economic revival. 
Other factors have also conspired to prevent Pretoria from playing an active 
role in the reconstruction of  Angola. The change in political leadership in South 
Africa did not immediately end UNITA’s relations with some powerful fi gures in 
South Africa. After the signing of  the Lusaka Accord between UNITA and the 
MPLA in 1994, the Fowler Commission on the violation of  UN Security Council 
sanctions against UNITA, found that there was evidence of  ‘signifi cant support 
provided to UNITA’ by individual arms and diamond dealers operating from South 
Africa. Although a crackdown by the South African government forced some of  
the individuals to relocate to other countries, this did nothing to convince the 
Angolan elite that South Africa had the will to halt the transfers of  military 
equipment to UNITA60. South Africa’s failed attempt to mediate in the Angolan 
civil war, and Savimbi’s visit to South Africa in 1999, earned South Africa a stern 
rebuke from Angolan elites who resented what they saw as South Africa’s ‘inter-
ference’ in the Angolan crisis and called for the UN to be the only valid and 
authorised mediator in the confl ict61. 
It is widely believed that regional integration works best if  it has more than 
one champion. And since South Africa has shown a wariness to play an assertive 
‘hegemonic’ role in driving integration, Angola, given its massive resources and 
economic potential, could play a decisive role alongside South Africa in deepen-
ing regional integration in the region. And Angolan elites admit that a strategic 
partnership between the two countries would be a great benefi t to their country 
and the region. Said, Lopo de Nascimento, the former Angolan prime minister:
“I think Angola and South Africa could have played the same sort of  role as motors 
of  the community of  Southern Africa, as France and Germany did in forging the 
European Union.”62
However, in order to be able to play this role, Angola has to contend with a 
number of  challenges such as underdevelopment, poor governance and widespread 
corruption, which are some of  the deterrents to foreign investment in that country63. 
59 Power and Interest News Report, 20 March 2006, The Increasing Importance of  African Oil, 
<www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=460&language_id=1>.
60 A. Conchiglia, op. cit.: 239 and <www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm>. De 
Beers, the South African diamond conglomerate, continued to buy diamonds mined by UNITA 
in violation of  the 1993 UN embargo. Some in the Angolan government argued that South 
Africa’s perceived failure to halt UNITA’s diamond smuggling showed its lack of  commitment 
to the UN embargo. Relations took another dive after South Africa’s failure to involve Angola 
when the former took over the role of  mediator for the civil strife in the DRC.
61 ibid.: 240. The Angolan leaders also saw South Africa’s attempt to bring Savimbi to the 
negotiation table as an attempt by South Africa to impose its idealistic model of  promoting 
peace through negotiation and compromise as a paternalistic attempt to resolve through nego-
tiation, a confl ict which in their view had become a military rather than a political one. 
62 A. Conchiglia, op. cit.: 246.
63 Ibid.: 244-245. R. Dowden, Africa, Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, Portobello Books, London, 
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The legacy of  Southern Africa’s violent past continues to infl uence the nature of  
regionalism and state-to-state relations in the region64. However, since events in 
one country can have a profound impact on its neighbours, the Southern African 
states have no option but to strengthen the ties that bind them. However, the 
unquestioning acceptance of  market integration as the only suitable model for a 
region marked by high levels of  underdevelopment carries the potential to per-
petuate levels of  the economic asymmetries that dominate the region. And this 
poses the question whether regional elites are willing to pursue the other strategy 
adopted by SADC, namely developmental integration, which, if  pursued in prac-
tice, will place the state as the key player in eliminating some of  the key imped-
iments to regional development and integration, namely, the high levels of  economic 
inequalities among countries in the region. And the extent to the region is likely 
to adopt a model which is informed by these realities remains to be seen.
* * *
Southern Africa has interacted with global forces for centuries, and today trade 
has infl uenced the nature of  regionalism in the region. In order to effectively 
respond to the impact of  such forces on the region, states have had to create 
partnerships with local and global non-state actors and with their neighbours and 
put in place innovative measures that will turn them into key players in the pro-
cess of  globalisation. The challenges of  disease, poverty, and underdevelopment 
in the region have conspired to ensure that the state remains a key actor in the 
process of  regionalism in Southern Africa. Tackling these challenges will 
be critical in the region’s attempt to integrate itself  into the world economy. This 
paper has also illustrated that despite challenges posed by small markets and 
trade imbalances in favour of  the most developed country in the region, the 
consequences of  non-integration – in the spirit of  the old regionalism – are likely 
to be dire. Seen from this perspective, the new regionalism appears to have reached 
an irreversible stage of  development in the region. Southern Africa is likely to 
reach higher levels of  economic development if  regional elites create conditions 
that are suitable for non-state actors from the region and elsewhere, to play an 
increasing role in deepening integration. The creation of  a partnership between 
states such as Angola and South Africa will go a long way towards the realisation 
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2008: 220, argues that in the Human Development Index, Angola is placed 161 out of  177 countries, 
and this is not improving. 
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